Coercion-Resistant Remote Voting using Decryption Mixes
Michael R. Clarkson and Andrew C. Myers
(Department of Computer Science, Cornell University)
The recently proposed Prêt à Voter election scheme uses
decryption mixes to achieve anonymity of votes and verifiability
of an election while requiring minimal trust in
the component of the election system that performs these
mixes. However, this scheme still requires trust in several
human and machine components; these requirements
make the scheme impractical for use in remote voting. To
adapt the scheme for remote voting, new protocols are proposed
to preserve anonymity and verifiability and additionally
achieve coercion-resistance. The scheme is also extended
to allow Condorcet voting methods, in which the ballots
rank the candidates. An implementation of the scheme
using Jif, a security-typed language, is in progress.