



IT Advisory

Windows passwords security

ADVISORY

WHOAMI

Agenda

- The typical windows environment
- Local passwords
 - Secure storage mechanisms: Syskey & SAM File
 - Password hashing & Cracking: LM & NTLM
- Into the domain
 - LSA secret & cached credentials

The typical Windows environment

- Active directory
 - Centralized identification & authentication
 - Kerberos, NTLM and LM
- Local accounts (e.g. local admin)
- Processes running with domain service accounts
 - E.g. backup/virus agents
- Laptops
 - Requirements for offline authentication
 - Cached credentials
- **Conclusion:** Need secure storage in Windows

Remember: User is weakest link



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Secure storage

- Syskey: Boot key used as master key for secure contents
 - Implementation:
 - Syskey on floppy @boot
 - Syskey derived from passphrase @boot
 - Syskey on the system: Obfuscation
- Stored in register SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\{JD,Skew1,GBG,Data}
- Cannot be read with normal tools (regedit)
- Stored in c:\windows\system32\config\system
- Exclusively locked by kernel/System user
- Security Accounts Manager (SAM) file
 - Encrypted with Syskey (as of Win2000)
 - Contains hashes of password (more later)
 - Same security/storage mechanism as Syskey (C:\windows\system32\config\SAM)

Not feasible for
remote administration

Attacking Syskey & SAM file

- Get SYSTEM/Kernel privilege
 - Requires administrative access (Local exploit)
- Physical access:
 - Boot other OS
 - Copy c:\windows\system32\config\system and c:\windows\system32\config\SAM
 - Crack passwords (more later)
 - Adjust SAM file (create new local admin)

- Or do it the easy way:
 - Use backups ☺
 - C:\windows\repair or other back-ups

AccessEnum displays who has access to items within a directory or registry key:

Path	Read	Write
d:	Everyone	Administrators, Users
d:\Backup06-12.bkf	Administrators, Users	Administrators

- Tools:
TEXT REMOVED, SEE REFERENCES

PWdump: How does it work

- TEXT REMOVED, PLEASE REFER TO <http://us1.samba.org/samba/ftp/pwdump/pwdump.c>

Results so far: A SAM file

```
File Edit Format View Help
Administrator:500:5B567CBBAD1A7C329[REDACTED]:606B6D16B5:C3B9E92[REDACTED]:E0FAB0A0EABE0B7FEF::
backup:1004:E9F7A00179921DA2F7[REDACTED]:F8DB5AE6:CFD5B112[REDACTED]:D313DB6B6E4A42B4::
root:1003:23D6D8E87B94D2E43FAL[REDACTED]:ACBEE1A:79A15D8D8B[REDACTED]:F4A66F597F5807C::
service:1005:4F7C3B9C4750BCCC1A[REDACTED]:381E4E281B:51368011[REDACTED]:36F981BCB32984C4::
Guest:501:NO PASSWORD*****:NO PASSWORD*****
SUPPORT_388945a0:1001:NO PASSWORD*****:9359CD837[REDACTED]:CEBCCF4D9AC091707::
```

- Format:

Username: ID: LM hash: NTLM hash::

Lan Manager Hashes

- History
 - Microsoft Lan Manager (OS) introduced in 198?
 - Main MS server OS until NT 3.1 (1993)
- All Windows versions before Vista/2008 server: Enabled by default
In Vista/2008 server it can be enabled
- Current use:
 - Legacy communication (Mainframe)
 - CIFS

Lan manager hashing

- ANSI password is transferred to uppercase only
- Padding with null until 14 bytes
- Split in two 7-byte arrays
- Calculate parity and add to array (result: 64bits)
- DES-encrypt the string "KGS!@# \$" using the array as key (2x)
- Concatenate 2 ciphertexts

ANSI not unicode

Uppercase,
reduce entropy

LM fails with length > 14

No freshness/salting

Determine if pwlength < 7

Attacking LM hashes

- Ideal: 95^{14} different passwords, (approx 2^{92})
- Uppercase: 67^{14}
- Split in two 7 char: 67^7 (approx 2^{43})
- No salting: Memory-Time tradeoff - Rainbow tables
 - LM hashes are cracked within a couple of minutes (rcrack)
 - CPU cracking in hours (john)
- By inspecting the second part of the LM-value, you can determine if the password had more than 7 characters

NTLM background

- New Technology Lan Manager (NTLM)
 - Both hash storage and communication protocol
- NTLM-communication:
 - NTLMv1
 - Introduced with Windows NT 3.1 (1993)
 - Overcome problems with LM (e.g. unicode, hashing)
 - Backwards compatible with LM
 - NTLMv2
 - Introduced with NT4 SP4, (1998)
 - Cryptographic improvements over NTLMv1

NTLM hash algorithm

- Simple:
 - MD4(password)
 - No salting, thus memory/space tradeoff
 - 128 bit
- Tools: John (bruteforce), Rcrack(rainbow tables), multiforcer (GPU cracking bruteforce)

Remember: Users are weakest link



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Summary: Putting it all together

LOADING




Example SAM file

- testuser1:":0F20048EFC645D0A179B4D5D6690BDF3:1120ACB74670C7DD46F1D3F5038A5CE8:::
- remote:":E52CAC67419A9A224A3B108F3FA6CB6D:8846F7EAE8FB117AD06BDD830B7586C:::
- joeuser:":E52CAC67419A9A224A3B108F3FA6CB6D:8846F7EAE8FB117AD06BDD830B7586C:::
- averageguy:":299CCF964D9A359BAAD3B435B51404EE:A5C07214487C87B584E8877DE72DCA0B:::
- harderpass:":B75838F7A57EE67993E28745B8BF4BA6:EC50F8A8149C93EF45AECB8AF96658E6:::
- demouser:":261A6631FE44BA4993E28745B8BF4BA6:371D5760453C1B000BCC016F8E23A83C:::
- randy:":98B5AFEB67293D6AAAD3B435B51404EE:A9F34664151F6360757B31644F37E025:::
- Asmith:":E165F0192EF85EBBAAD3B435B51404EE:E4EBE0E7EF708DC9FD240135D3D43D89:::
- Bsmith:":136A8418CF76C4F7AAD3B435B51404EE:3431E75AD08DCA56EB53AEAAB9926589:::
- csmith:":BB26C063532826AA531C3383FDDDBFF2A:A2746ED4129985C0251D2B968C4889FE:::

- What do you see?

- Online cracking: <http://plain-text.info/>

Getting into the domain



LSA secrets & Cached credentials

- LSA secrets:
 - encrypted with SYSKEY
 - Contains up to 10 cached credentials
 - May contain passwords for service accounts

```
9E C9 54 C2 7E 6B 1F F4 5E 30 80 29 CF 09 57 AC ..T~k.^0.)..W.  
EE 9A 54 BE A0 A9 54 2E 4D A0 5C C5 B2 7B 65 F0 ..T...T.M.\..{e.  
D0 D9 06 0D 7E 42 BF 52 7D 33 1B 82 04 40 CE 9C ....~B.R}3...@..  
68 A7 60 C3 2D E9 40 64 27 6B 9B BD 6D 1C 9F 69 h\}..@'k..m..i  
32 38 6E F1 4E F1 15 40 93 DB 3A A1 94 07 EE 7E 28n.N..@:.....~  
7F 99 6B 19 CF 01 46 10 E1 34 31 83 9D 1E 7B A7 ..k...F..41...{.
```

```
_SC_InstallerService  
39 00 21 00 12 00 54 00 64 00 74 00 52 00 71 00 Pa$$$$.1.@3.4.
```

Password of account
“_SC_InstallerService”

- Tools: Cain, PwdumpX, LSAdump2

Cached credentials

- In LSA secrets cached credentials are stored (obfuscated)
- Maximum 10 accounts

- Tools: Pwdumpx, cain

- Format:

```
UserName:95C0D475F5E0C888DD3E0F4D56CA3C75:ActiveDirectoryDomain:Domain  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
\audit:ACAB320C4963 [REDACTED] DBB124C7BD6C199: [REDACTED] : [REDACTED] .NL  
[REDACTED]-admin:20B2D2 [REDACTED] 603E84D202A34A6CB8F6B: [REDACTED] : [REDACTED] .NL  
[REDACTED]boren:A57ACEE [REDACTED] 47E5D18A3CFE4D5D725C: [REDACTED] : [REDACTED] .NL
```

- Hash: MSCACHE = MD4(MD4(password) || lowercase(username))
- Salted with username, thus no rainbow tables
 - There is one for the "Administrator" account
- Tools: Cain, John with mscach patch, rcrack

Other interesting password stores

- IE passwords
- Messenger
- Outlook express
 - Use PSTGdump

- Firefox password store

- Or just search (outlook) mailbox

Fixing it:

- Disable LM hashing
- Don't use passwords? Use smartcards/tokens...
 - Enable password complexity
- Minimize local accounts
- No password reuse between systems (images)
- Harden service accounts
- Minimize cached credentials
- Rename built in accounts
- Logging & monitoring

Questions?

References

- <http://www.irongeek.com>
- <http://reedarvin.thearvins.com/tools/>
- <http://www.oxid.it/>
- <http://swamp.foofus.net/>
- <http://us1.samba.org/samba/ftp/pwdump/pwdump.c>
- <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTLM>
- www.Dilbert.com

NTLM protocols

- NTLMv1
- Challenge-response
 - Server -> Client: Challenge
 - Client->Server: split MD4(pass) in 3 chunks,
send DES(challenge, key[1])+
DES(challenge, key[2])+
DES(challenge, key[3])



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